The failure of the Californian Mondavi’s implantation in France: entrepreneurship and corporatisme

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Abstract: An explanation for why plans to set up business in the small village of Aniane, in the Languedoc region of France, were a failure for Mondavi, the pioneer of California’s Napa Valley.

Initially, everyone came out a winner. The project nevertheless ground to a halt because of an anti-Mondavi revolt. The leader of this revolt was Aimé Guibert, a local wine-grower violently opposed to “industrial wines” and himself the producer of one of France’s best wines.

The interesting point of this conflict is that it reveals a type of entrepreneur that has been underestimated by entrepreneurship theory. Using the rent-seeking trend as its basis, this article highlights the characteristics of the corporatiste entrepreneur, who prefers avoiding threats to seizing opportunities.

Keywords: Mondavi; France; entrepreneurship; corporatisme; wine.


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This investment project seemed to have everything going for it. It is probable that all those involved would have benefited from it: the Mondavi group would have produced a wine of excellent quality, the wine-growers and local coopérative would have been able to gain access to the commercial know-how of the American company, and even the Hérault département could have improved its image as an area producing high-quality wines. These reasons explain the staunch support from the President of the Hérault Conseil Général (departmental council) for the American company’s project. A report published in January 2001³ by Prodexport, the main regional structure with an international vocation, explained that
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“Languedoc-Roussillon seems to be the number one magnet in France for investors. The fact that the Languedoc-Roussillon region is not considered as a historical, wine-growing region is actually a considerable advantage in the eye of investors, making it seem more ‘open’ to new fields of experimentation, notably regarding vins de pays (quality wines associated with a particular geographical region), as well as being a region that has a more favourable climate than most other French regions.” (Prodexport, 2001, p.24)

Despite all this support, the project failed. An anti-Mondavi coalition gradually emerged. This movement of discontent became a majority in Aniane and stopped the project by taking advantage of an election which changed the municipal majority and elected Manuel Diaz, the main opponent to the project.

The Mondavi affair is, for those interested in the subject of entrepreneurship, a fine example of comparative entrepreneurship. It is an opportunity to highlight the cultural differences which exist between France and the USA regarding entrepreneurial methods and how these differences, in this specific case, had a negative influence. Although the phenomenon of entrepreneurship exists in most regions of the world, it is not a homogenous phenomenon. The way entrepreneurs behave is influenced by the cultures, needs and habits of the region. These factors are integrated, assimilated and interpreted by entrepreneurs and are reflected in the way they act and the way they build up their companies (Filion, 1997, p.140).

The Mondavi affair reveals the important role played by entrepreneurial cultures and the influence they have on decisions. This comparative study of different types of entrepreneurship is at the heart of this paper. First, we will explain our methodology and then we will analyse the reasons why Mondavi failed in his attempt to settle in Aniane, thus making it possible in turn to reveal two types of entrepreneurship that differ in many respects.

1 A comparative analysis of French and US entrepreneurship models

There have been many comparative analyses of France and the USA, covering a wide range of subjects. One of the most famous is the analysis of the political and judicial systems, De la démocratie en Amérique (Democracy in America), written in 1835 by Alexis de Tocqueville and, more recently (1985), the book by Cohen-Tanugi, Le droit sans l’Etat, sur la démocratie en France et en Amérique (The law without the State, on democracy in France and the USA). The latter reveals that there is a fundamental difference between the two countries: one is a self-regulated, contractual society, the other is based on a centralised State model. We can also see that the Law has an essential place in US society, which was originally founded by lawyers, “the only settlers arrived from the Old World who were literate enough to be able to publicly express their views and deliver articulate political speeches” (Cohen-Tanugi, 1985, p.29), whereas in France the énarques are in the highest positions in both the state and society.

When it comes to the management sector, a book by Pascal Baudry (2003) is particularly revealing. We learn about the existence of numerous differences in matters of law, relationships, time and space management … Finally, and closer to our concerns, entrepreneurship has also been the subject of comparative analyses, the most recent publications being Fayolle (2000) and Volery and Servais (2000) as part of the programme ‘Global Entrepreneurship Monitor’.
Starting from a comparative analysis of the USA and France, Fayolle (2000, p.42) considers that in France, cultural specificities come under the role of the State, the way money is considered, the desire for privileges and fear of failure: the French State is a centraliser and ‘Jacobin’, behaving like the big decision-maker of the economy and which has played a part in the development of a culture of large companies and civil service. The State also employs the intellectual élites after selecting them, directing them towards the French Grandes Écoles which then train them. These Grandes Écoles, including ‘Polytechnique’ and ‘ENA’, are powerful machines for encouraging neither the setting up of businesses nor entrepreneurs.

In addition to this planned economy/élitism, there is the French cult of individualism, often associated with the ‘sense of honour’ that we find in Rostand’s character, Cyrano de Bergerac, ‘courageous, individualist, contemptuous of money, more concerned with the panache and beauty of gesture than certain of success in the action he undertakes’ (Bizaguet, 1993).6 Nevertheless, the image commonly associated with French entrepreneurs is not always that of a dynamic and conquering individual (an image that is associated instead with captains of industry from wealthy capitals or regions), but more that of the manager of a small or medium-sized company managing his business as a good family man (pater familias). The image most commonly seen is that of the manager of a small, rural company, limited to traditional activities (a small agricultural family business, craftsmanship or shopkeeping), with a relatively low level of technology (Duchêneaut, 1996; Courault and Trouvé, 2000) and cultivating his love of his profession.

Although very much in an individualistic perspective, French small business owners seem to be highly tradition-oriented. This type of entrepreneurship can be described quite well as being characterised by values such as perennial, independence and, to a lesser extent, growth, although the latter is limited. We are reminded of the remote notable in Marchesnay’s typology (2000). He thinks in the long term, is often concerned with perennial and with a view to transmitting his business to his family. The high disparity between men and women also comes from tradition. According to the GEM data, and taking into account the 21 countries covered by the GEM survey, France is bottom for female entrepreneurship, with the USA enjoying a total entrepreneurial activity (TEA) situated at around 8% for women, almost 30 times more than that of women in France (Volery and Servais, 2000, p.17).

Sometimes, this traditionalism generates entrepreneurial phenomena of a very distinctive nature that we will refer to as corporatiste entrepreneurship. In our opinion, the characteristics of a corporatiste entrepreneur are his defence of vested benefits and the preservation of a privileged position.

“When it comes to privileges, the French have ingeniously managed to multiply them and then pass them down in a caste-like system. The privileges given by money, share capital, academic meritocracy or status play an important part in the sense that considerable energy is initially spent on appropriating them, and then even more energy is used to maintain them.” (Fayolle, 2000, p.42)

This observation by Fayolle shows the extent to which the protective instinct governs the French spirit of enterprise.

The corporatiste entrepreneur is reasonably independent-minded and individualistic, coming out of isolation only when developments that seem not to be in his interests occur. Corporatiste entrepreneurship as we describe it is entrepreneurial behaviour based on a community of interests which become structured in a variety of forms (professional
unions, defence associations, business clubs, various institutions, spontaneous, informal get-togethers and so on) in order to act, as a corporation, to preserve a situation or maintain an established order. In our opinion, leaders of corporatiste groups can be real entrepreneurs. The creation of a corporatiste structure is an entrepreneurial act in the same way as the creation of a company. It is clearly part of a process based on an initiative leading to the creation of a new structure in order to create (or preserve) a certain value. Corporatiste entrepreneurs negotiate to the best of their ability in order to make decisions that are favourable to the interests of the group that has been set up. It is a type of entrepreneurship in which individuals must conform to the law of the group in order to avoid impairing the efficacy of the defence action. The entrepreneurial purpose of this move is not about innovation or change but about defending interests and avoiding threats. For example, as said by Lucien Rebuffel, former President of the Confédération Générale des PME (Federation of small and medium-sized companies) (CGPME, 1998, p.5):

“No, there is no other way, no alternative for safeguarding what we believe in other than to stay ‘united in Doctrine and Action’ against everything threatening, or detrimental to, SME and SMI in France, whatever the source of the threat or nuisance.”

Corporatisme also testifies to a proximity reflex which favours what is close and expels the unknown or alien (‘hell is other people’). In this case, the professional environment uses conformity and solidarity to exert considerable pressure, which has a retrospective effect on entrepreneurial behaviour. This type also includes the entrepreneur whose need for self-esteem requires good recognition from his milieu (the need for socialisation). These entrepreneurs become notables, sometimes by getting elected to positions of responsibility in consular chambers or professional organisations (the need for power). This type of entrepreneur is present

“in activities with little potential for advancement and a low level of competitiveness. The result is anti-competition behaviour which tends to favour the companies situated within the boundaries of the territory and to create privileged positions.” (Marchesnay and Messeghem, 2001, p.24)

In theory, it is possible to base this type of entrepreneurship on the rent-seeking behaviour trend (Buchanan et al., 1980 and Baumol, 1990). In the paper on entrepreneurship, Baumol (1990) demonstrates that entrepreneurs can invest their talents in both productive and non-productive activities (corruption, theft or pirating, abusive claims for compensation or damages, and so on). To introduce the idea of rent-seeking, the existence of paid activities must not only be accepted, but in the form of transfers that do not involve any productive counterpart. Of these paid activities, strategies for the protection of an economic position and for limiting competition are considered to be a source of the creation of a privileged position. In other words, we can speak of rent-seeking when an entrepreneur’s statement of social consequences is negative (Dejardin, 2000). Rent-seeking can be of either public or private origin. “The legal framework that structures productive activities can, by limiting competition in particular, give rise to rent-seeking situations”, (Dejardin, 2000). We will see later in this paper to what extent such behaviour played a role at both the public and private levels.

This corporatiste conception of the entrepreneur can be opposed to an ‘opportunity based’ conception which prevails in English-speaking countries, particularly in the USA.
This theoretical conception is based on the dominating trend (Eckhardt and Shane, 2003; Shane, 2000; Singh, 2000; Bygrave and Hofer, 1991; Kirzner, 1979).

The history of the constitution of the USA, a country fully supportive of liberalism, is fundamentally different from that of France, where the interventionism of the State has left its mark (Cohen-Tanugi, 1985; Bruyat, 1993). In order to understand the instrumental role the entrepreneur has in American society, we can refer to this quotation by Thomas Jefferson, one of the founding fathers of the American republic,

“The best society is one that is composed of the greatest possible number of independent entrepreneurs … owning the tools they need for their activity, sole responsible for organising their work and therefore receiving no orders from any other mortal …” (Bizaguet, 1993, p.31)

The essence of the liberal economists’ political and economic philosophy is contained in this sentence. The entrepreneur becomes the basic unit of the market economy and, in the process, the very foundation of liberalism. This liberal conception is clearly explained in the American or English definition of the SME. They were defined, as early as 1953 by the American Small Business Act, as companies owned and managed in an independent manner and with no dominant position in their sector of activity. According to Toulouse,

“In the USA, the general public knows at least as many names of entrepreneurs as of politicians; this situation bears witness to the fact that these entrepreneurs are some of the elements of an ideology and the realities that constitute this country.” (Toulouse (1979) quoted by Verstraete (2003))

In English-speaking countries, the entrepreneur is also associated with innovation, dynamism, private initiative, a taste for risk-taking, etc. The entrepreneur embodies a form of permanent modernity where, contrary to what many people think, the quest for progress is maybe more important than the search for profit. This is the image of the high tech SME, the stereotype of the modern company par excellence, creating jobs and capable of the most difficult technological feats. It is something comparable to the model of Silicon Valley in California. The GEM survey shows that the USA figure among the most entrepreneurial countries (after Brazil and South Korea), with a total entrepreneurial activity (TEA) exceeding 12% whereas France ranks 18th, with 2.2% (Volery and Servais, 2000, p.16). Similarly, US entrepreneurship is strongly structured around the notion of opportunity, as much on the theoretical level (Singh, 2000) as on the practical level. According to the GEM survey, 52% of the people polled in the USA affirm they can see some opportunities for setting up a company within the following six months whereas only 17% reach the same conclusion in France (Volery and Servais, 2000, p.30). The USA has the highest score for the number of entrepreneurial opportunities in the 21 countries, with France one of the lowest.

We can thus talk about two distinct types of entrepreneurs. The first type symbolises the independent spirit that small shopkeepers, craftsmen and wine-growers in France have always displayed, notably regarding major capital and the authorities. This conception stems from a traditionalist and individualistic view of the entrepreneur which differentiates itself from the ultra-liberal philosophy. The liberalism the CGPME claims in France is thus a temperate liberalism (CGPME, 1993). Inversely, a more modern image is typified by the type of entrepreneurship found in English-speaking countries. The entrepreneur resembles the Schumpeterian innovator, who invests, creates and takes risks. Certain values, such as autonomy, creativity and originality give the entrepreneur his pioneering advantage. Quick growth leads to measuring performance
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through money and to a certain degree of competitive aggressiveness. This form of modern, individualistic entrepreneurship is prevalent in specialised scientific literature. Table 1 summarises the differences between these two typical ideals of entrepreneurship and we have used it to construct the matrix presenting the results (Appendix 1).

Table 1 Comparison between the corporatiste and liberal forms of entrepreneurship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corporatiste entrepreneurship</th>
<th>Liberal entrepreneurship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Need for recognition</td>
<td>Need for achievement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for a sense of belonging</td>
<td>Need for self-realisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protective instinct</td>
<td>Competitive instinct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perennial and limited growth</td>
<td>Innovation, strong and quick growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense of a privileged position</td>
<td>Search for a pioneering advantage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The notable</td>
<td>The nomad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat-avoiding strategy</td>
<td>Opportunity-seeking strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejection solidarity (defensive initiative)</td>
<td>Project culture (offensive initiative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional image</td>
<td>Modern image</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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2 Methodology

According to Dasen and Retschitzki (1989), two complementary approaches can be distinguished from one another in the field of intercultural research: intercultural diversity and intercultural interaction.

“Studying cultural diversity, by establishing explicit comparisons between cultures or not, makes it possible to better understand all human societies and one’s own society too. In the field of human sciences, the comparative method makes it possible to put into question theories that have been established within a particular context but that are too often considered a priori as universal.” (Dasen and Retschitzki, 1989)

In the field of entrepreneurship, it is precisely in order to relativise the individualistic conception of entrepreneurship in English-speaking countries that many authors have taken an interest in the informal form of African entrepreneurship (Denieuil, 1992; Hernandez, 1997; Saporta and Kombou, 2000; Kandem, 2001). The methods used are different from one author to another. For some authors, analysing the entrepreneurial specificity of a region implies adopting ethnomethodological methods (Dana, 1992) or ethno-industrial methods (Denieuil, 1992). For others, it is possible, on the contrary, to adopt more quantitative methods (Blais and Toulouse, 1990).

But this approach does not exhaust the field of comparative analysis because it limits itself to identifying forms that are specific to regions or countries without really taking into account the interactions between these different forms. In other words,

“in the world of today, the contacts between cultural groups are on the increase, in very different situations and for many different reasons. An important part of intercultural research deals with all the phenomena linked to these contacts.” (Dasen and Retschitzki, 1989)
This is the second part of *intercultural interaction*. By applying this distinction to the field of entrepreneurship, we can see that this approach has more rarely been the subject of studies, particularly at the empirical level. This is probably due to the difficulty in finding situations with contact between culturally different groups, given that entrepreneurship is a phenomenon that is deeply rooted in a particular territory, at the local level (Bruyat, 1993; Filion, 1999), which makes contacts more rare.

The interest of our case study is to come within the scope of this second approach to intercultural interaction.

### 3 A case study

This study is part of the framework of a qualitative method based on a case study whose interest has been accredited by many studies (Yin, 1989; Hlady-Rispal, 2002). The case study method receives great attention nowadays and finds different applications in the field of entrepreneurship. According to Yin (1989), the study of a single case is a choice that is all the more relevant when the case presents all the conditions which make it possible to test a theory, when it provides an “opportunity for observing a phenomenon that has been inaccessible to scientific investigation until then” and when its subject is extreme and unique. The case of Mondavi’s failed attempt to settle in Aniane satisfies all three criteria.

First of all, it is clearly a contemporary phenomenon which is difficult to dissociate from its context, and above all it is a genuine opportunity. Effectively, cases that speak of simple SME and that receive so much media coverage are rare. We identified 77 papers published in 13 newspapers and written by 27 different journalists (Appendix 2). Moreover, although contacts between cultural groups are increasing in a globalised economy, it is still rare to see comparative studies on entrepreneurship based on an intercultural research approach covering all the phenomena linked to these contacts. The Mondavi case provides this opportunity. Finally, this case is extreme (it tells of a failure case) because SME rarely invest directly abroad and failures are not favourite subjects.

We searched the Europresse.com database using the keywords: *Mondavi, Aniane, Hérault, Languedoc, Roussillon*. Other papers, from local newspapers, were added to this research. Overall, the database contains 77 papers (Appendix 2).

This database was used to organise the case study by supplying the key points of the story and describing the main protagonists. It was also used as a way to identify the statements made by the protagonists in this affair: on the one hand the Mondavi family and their representative in France, David Pearson, and on the other hand the members of the Guibert family, who led the hostile reaction to the project (Appendix 1). Only the sentences in inverted commas can be directly attributed to the different players in this affair.

Secondary data are data that already exist. They can usually be obtained for a small price and quickly. Contacting the people who published them is not always necessary. They are of historical value. Moreover, working on papers published in newspapers, which are public sources, makes it possible to avoid any problems of anonymity or confidentiality.
This type of data also has its limitations. For instance, the press has a failing: it is always on the look-out for what is spectacular. The definitive end of Mondavi’s installation was widely reported (six papers from 16 to 18 August 2001). Another shortcoming lies in the fact that the quotations extracted are often truncated or out of context as regards the conversation. Nevertheless, this problem can be solved by crosschecking several papers taken from different newspapers. Despite these obvious shortcomings, choosing to conduct a case study based on newspaper papers is not trivial and fits the primary objective of our research. Effectively, the press builds up images and it is these very representations we are interested in. Our study was conducted with a view to being a comparative analysis.

4 Presentation of the facts

Robert Mondavi first came to the Languedoc region in the spring of 1996, with a view to purchasing a property or making a strategic alliance with a producer, as he had done before in Chile and Italy (this is the simplest way to gain admittance to a region). He offered to purchase the most prestigious vineyard, Daumas Gassac. The price he offered did not satisfy the owner, Aimé Guibert, who refused (N.C., 2001a). The American did not abandon his project of settling in Aniane, where, in addition to the Daumas Gassac vineyard, a smaller vineyard belonging to the Vaillé family is located, producing a famous Syrah wine, ‘La Grange des Pères’, as well as the Château Capion. The presence of these three quality products demonstrates the potential of the land available in Aniane (Flandre, 2001; Degionni, 2001a; Degionni, 2001b). But in Aniane, as part of the restructuring of the Languedoc region vineyards, funded by the European Union, one third of the vines which were used to produce table wines had been uprooted and no land which would allow Mondavi to produce the vintage Syrah wine he wanted was for sale (Sedar, 2001). This was why Mondavi tried instead to obtain land in the council forest, the Arboussas massif. With this in mind, he met the Mayor, who was responsible for the area.

The Mondavi group did not choose the Arboussas massif by chance. During the 1970s, a study by the geographer, Henri Enjalbert, from the University of Bordeaux revealed that there was soil in the middle of this massif where the grapes could dig their roots very deeply, suffering in their search for the nourishment they need and thus producing wines with a fine flavour (Le Puill, 2000a, 2000b; Dupont, 2000a). The second advantage of this vineyard was the microclimate. The valley is surrounded by the warm plains of the Languedoc while its own climate is fresher and cooler, thus delaying the harvest by three weeks compared to the average date in Languedoc (Le Puill, 2000a, 2000b). Because of these meteorological and physical characteristics, the land around Aniane is exceptional, propitious to the production of great wine. The Guibert family came to invest in this land for the same reasons. During the 1970s, they were precursors when they settled in the region and cleared part of the Arboussas massif for cultivation (Le Puill, 2000a), in order to create the vintage Daumas Gassac wine. They were therefore afraid that Mondavi’s arrival might upset the balance. As a result, they were fiercely opposed to Mondavi’s project to clear the forest for cultivation. Samuel, one of Aimé Guibert’s five sons, claimed that their opposition as owners of the Daumas Gassac ‘mas’ was first and foremost for ecological reasons. According to him,
“Clearance on the scale of what is planned in the Mondavi project could modify the micro-climate of the Gassac valley, which is characterised by cool nights (8 or 9 degrees lower than in the village of Aniane). This coolness is the reason behind the thick-skinned grapes that play such a key role in making the wine produced here so typical. The Guibert family are afraid that all kinds of chemical treatments will be used on the future Mondavi vineyard, when they themselves have always preferred sheep manure, the presence of birds and insects and, as the only treatment for the vines, the Bordeaux mixture.” (Coignard, 2000)

We learned in June 2000 that the mayor of Aniane was willing to rent 50 hectares on the hill of the Arboussas to Mondavi. This area would be cleared for cultivation and planted, 50 million francs invested and eight jobs created. Moreover, Mr. Ruiz, the mayor of Aniane, evoked the benefits a vintage wine would bring to Aniane and the windfall in terms of trade tax (N.C., 1998a, 2000a, 2001b, 2001c; Flandre, 2001; Degionni, 2001c; Ramon, 2000). In addition to the 50 hectares rented, it was also learned that Mondavi was looking for private land to build a state-of-the-art wine storehouse with a capacity for 300,000 bottles a year.

But these arguments did not convince and the reactions to this decision were not long in coming. The wine-growers of Aniane put forward several arguments to the mayor’s decision. Mr. Van Ruyssenvelde, President of the Aniane wine-growers’ union, underlined the fact that the mayor’s acceptance seemed rather sudden and unclear. What transaction led him to reach this conclusion? He specified that there was a development project under way in Aniane and some of the surrounding villages in which about a hundred hectares would be used to enlarge existing estates or to install eight young people from the region. Some land in the Arboussas massif could be used in these projects, bearing in mind that the clearing process for plantation would be limited and hence would not bother hill-walkers and hunters. And that the young people had not received the authorisations granted to this ‘American billionaire’ (Bernard, 2000b).

This discontent was compounded by that of the users of the council forest: the Arboussas massif. Hunters and walkers practise their favourite activities there all year. Obviously, these groups were opposed to the Mondavi project. At the top of the list, Aimé Guibert, who was undoubtedly the one who had dynamised the region in the last 20 years, and who was disturbed by the project. With friends, he created the Association of the Arboussas massif in order to raise public awareness and defend this protected site (Flandre, 2001; N.C., 2000a; Bernard, 2000b).

Moreover, many people questioned the reality of the advantages that would result from the project. Was the payment of a trade tax and the creation of eight jobs a good argument for the project (Nappez, 2000)? Would the creation of these eight jobs not have a detrimental effect on the interests of these eight less privileged young people? Would they not also pay the trade tax for their activity? As they would not be able to develop, they would maybe become employees of Mondavi instead of being free and responsible farmers (as the president of the wine-growers’ union and Aimé Guibert, owner of Daumas-Gassac, claimed). The mayor replied, “between 50 hectares which earn nothing and 50 hectares with a high added value, the choice is easy” (Nappez, 2000). Besides, the inhabitants of Aniane wondered about the rent that would be paid by Mondavi, which would be proportional to turnover. The wine-growers wondered what turnover was being referred to, knowing that Mondavi Aniane could sell its wine at cost price to ‘Vichon Méditerranée’, another subsidiary of the Mondavi group set up in Languedoc. In this case, the turnover could be much lower than the mayor’s forecasts.
Finally, of the land targeted by the Mondavi project, that situated in the private sector was to be the subject of a preemption. In May 2000, the SAFER announced its intention to preempt the land targeted by Mondavi 'at the request of the wine-growing profession' to allow young wine-growers to settle there. In July, the pre-emption was accepted by the government’s commissioner. Through this preemption, the SAFER became the owner of the land and the negotiations then had to be made between them and any possible buyers. This meant that Mondavi was no longer the only buyer for the land, and three other propositions were analysed. To general surprise, it was learned that Guibert himself was a candidate (Yaouanc, 2003, p.68).

As a result of this, Mondavi modified his strategy by strengthening his ties with the wine-growers and cave coopérative in Aniane. This strategy for defending their interests worked, as Mondavi continued his negotiations with the local wine-growers, who were concerned about finding their interest in the project and were negotiating to obtain advantages in different sectors. The negotiations were highly favoured by the institutions at local and departmental levels, which saw the Mondavi’s installation as a positive point for the promotion of the region. Mondavi and the coopérative would make a vintage in common, with Mondavi in charge of marketing it (Flandre, 2001; N.C., 2000b). This partnership would guarantee a revenue of 50,000 francs/hectare for the 238 members of the coopérative (as opposed to a price per hectolitre, in order to limit the yield in quantity). A bonus of 700 francs per hectolitre produced would be paid to the coopérative which, thanks to this windfall, could easily be invested in the production of high quality wines (Bernard, 2001b). The local professionals believed that they would thus take advantage of a glowing future thanks to this installation (Ramon, 2001a) and planned to implement a quality strategy, based on the terroir, that would allow them to fight competition from South Africa, Argentina, Italy and Spain (Bernard, 2001b). At the end of February 2001, an agreement was signed and the clearance file was sent to the DRAF (Regional directorate for agriculture and forests).

These negotiations made it possible to establish a new winning solution for a great many of the key players. They found themselves in a win-win-win type game, borrowed from the famous version developed in Silicon Valley where the third winner was the land. But it was not enough to erase the hesitations of the inhabitants, despite the intervention of the local authorities. In March 2001, a communist candidate, Mr. Diaz, stood against the mayor in office, Mr. Ruiz. His campaign for the municipal elections was based on the theme of rejection of the Mondavi offer. He was elected, to the disappointment of the local and regional wine-growing profession, which had been converted by the arrival of Mondavi. The new mayor cancelled the clearance file (Bernard, 2001c). In his negotiations, the American had no doubt not taken into account the opinion of the inhabitants of the village, who would probably not have voted for the communist candidate had it not been for his rejection of Mondavi. Most of the inhabitants of Aniane remained unconvinced. After this change of mayor at the town hall, Mondavi decided to definitively abandon his project and withdrew all his interests from Languedoc-Roussillon (N.C., 2001d, 2001e, 2001f, 2001g; Bernard, 2001b; Bruynooghe, 2001; Degionni, 2001a, 2001d).

What can possibly explain the failure of the American group Mondavi’s strategy for installation in the small, French village of Aniane? A priori, all the principles for a good installation strategy were respected, including a progressive installation since 1997 (Vichon France). There was considerable support from local professionals and the region’s main political leaders. The ecological preservation of the site had been taken into
consideration (small vine plots). There would be a creation of value in the production and commercial vineyard (modernisation of Aniane’s wine storehouse, input of considerable know-how in terms of marketing at an international level) and promotion of the region’s brand image.

To understand this failure, it is sufficient to demonstrate the many cultural and entrepreneurial differences that exist between a US entrepreneur and a French entrepreneur.

5 Illustration of liberal entrepreneurship: the Mondavi family project for creating vintage wine

Robert Mondavi is a classic example of a liberal US entrepreneur. He combines the style of the visionary entrepreneur who sets out to conquer the world, and that of the pioneering entrepreneur who dares to innovate and revolutionise the rules of his market (N.C., 2000a). In the biography, ‘Robert Mondavi of the Napa Valley’, Ray writes:

“Robert Mondavi is more often among the leaders than not, and more than any other Napa Valley producer, he has been an innovator, an encourager, an active helper and an example.” (Ray, 1984, p.14)

In 1943, Robert Mondavi’s family bought the Charles Krug Winery (Gaston-Breton, 2001; N.C., 1998a). In the 1960s, Robert Mondavi travelled the world in search of the best. In 1965 he created his own Vineyard, ‘Robert Mondavi Winery’ in Oakville, in the heart of the Napa Valley. One year later, he joined forces with Baron Philippe de Rothschild to create ‘Opus One’ (Gaston-Breton, 2001; Degionni, 2001b; N.C., 1999, 2000a; Pudlowski, 1999; Nau, 1995; Bernard, 2000b). Without a doubt, Mondavi was a precursor as he was the first to inform the world of the high quality of Californian wines. Because of this, he became an emblematic figure of the Napa Valley, the international renown of which he still plays a part in promoting (Ray, 1984; Bond and Porter, 2000). Mondavi likes winning, especially with others; first with the wine-growers in his region and his country, then with the other major wine producers throughout the world (Bernard, 2000b). In addition to his partnership with the Rothschild family, today Mondavi has many other partnerships around the world: in Italy, with the Frescobaldi family in Tuscany, in Chile with the Eduardo Chadwick family and, since 2000, in Australia with the leading Australian wine producer, Southcorp (N.C., 1999, 2001h).

It is for these reasons that Robert Mondavi can be described as an entrepreneur who is both enterprising and nomadic, to use the typology developed by Marchesnay (2001). Mondavi corresponds to the enterprising entrepreneur in the Napa Valley, enjoying a high level of both territorial legitimacy, as he is the one that has played a key role in making this region what it is today in the wine market (Porter and Bond, 2004), and competitive legitimacy, as his company markets the best Californian wines and, on 29th October 2001, entered the Forbes magazine Top 200 best SMEs in America at number 196 (www.forbes.com). Mondavi can also be qualified as a nomadic entrepreneur to the extent that by multiplying his sites in Italy, Chile, Argentina and France, he has placed his company in the strategic group of national companies with international influence (Coelho and Rastoin, 2001). Mondavi perfectly fits the image of the US self-made man who dreams of founding an empire and a dynasty:
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Everyone thought I was crazy when I said I wanted to change traditions. But then, a few years ago I was also thought to be crazy when I thought that one day I could produce one of the greatest wines in the world,” said Mondavi (N.C., 2000c).

In our tables of statements (Appendix 1), we have chosen several quotes from members of the Mondavi family and from David Pearson which are the perfect illustration of this type of entrepreneur. Most of the statements confirm the characteristic traits of American business culture, as identified by Baudry in 2003: concentration on the task in hand more than on relationships, optimism and thinking ‘big’, and the quest for the Win-Win, or even the Win-Win-Win, game by associating the land into the strategy. References to the concept of ‘project’ are effectively very common:

“The lack of support given to the project by the newly-elected mayor and town council in Aniane […] represents an uncertainty and risks that are too high for the feasibility of the project in the long term.” (Bruynooghe, 2001);

“This is a long term project, which will only be profitable in ten to fifteen years” (Medevielle, 2000);

“We have decided to withdraw from the project definitively. There are too many personal and political interests for us to comprehend” (Degionni, 2001a);

 “[Our] project does not involve setting up an American-style winery. What we want is a vineyard that will produce good quality wine from its own vines” (Monin, 2000);

“This is a French project that will fit in perfectly with Languedocian culture” (Ramon, 2000);

“We are negotiating directly with the wine-growers of Aniane as our installation must be transparent. This is a condition that is vital for promoting this project, which is for around fifty hectares” (L.L., 2000).

For optimism and thinking ‘big’, we have chosen:

“I am very confident; we are going to be able to do great things here” (N.C., 2000);

“a great wine always makes people happy” (Medevielle, 2000b);

“Our guiding principle is to make great wines and to find the best way to do so” (Ramon, 1999);

“a truly excellent wine” (Medevielle, 2000);

“The wines produced here could become some of the best in the world” (Ramon, 1999);

“This really is an exceptional place in which we are going to be able to create a product of extremely high quality,” (Nappez, 2000).

As regards the desire to construct a winning game, several statements give evidence of the Mondavi family’s desire to fit in with such a system: ‘help them to improve the quality of their wine’, ‘take advantage of our sales network’, ‘a privileged access to our history of experience and our know-how’. To these statements should be added those that make more explicit reference to the land and culture of the region: “with the greatest respect for the know-how of the local wine-growers”, “respecting the history, culture and people of this region”, “[We] have been working with ecologists for months to make an inventory of the plant species that must be preserved and we propose the creation of
small plots of five hectares within the forest so as not to transform the Arboussas into a vast area of open land” (Monin, 2000), “This is a French project that will fit in perfectly with Languedocian culture” (Ramon, 2000).

Self-making, the competitive instinct, a sense of innovation and the ability to take advantage of opportunities … are just some of the solid reasons behind our description of Robert Mondavi as a liberal entrepreneur. When faced with this sort of entrepreneur, self-defence and corporatiste mechanisms played a key role.

6 Illustration of corporatiste entrepreneurship: the creation of a defence committee in the Guibert family’s Arboussas massif

Aimé Guibert can be compared to Robert Mondavi. Aniane’s renown is due in great part to the legend behind his vineyard, Daumas Gassac. It produces a quality wine sold all over the world and which is considered to be one of the best wines in the region. Aimé Guibert settled in Aniane in the 1970s and is thus a precursor too, despite describing himself as an old-style countryman and frequently referring to his land:

“Today, I have all a countryman could wish for, and I love my land. I respect it. I like to pick up a handful to smell its earthy smell. I never force chemical fertilisers on my land and I maintain the hedges for the birds, wildlife and insects.” (Yaouanc, 2003)

This love of the land and his role as a pioneer are the basis of his right to claim the defence of the Aniane region. Guibert corresponds to Marchesnay’s typology of the notable entrepreneur (2000, 2001) whose aim to preserve his renown may be a reason behind his opposition.

“The fear of seeing a company set up next door to him and that would take some of his renown seems to be an unbearable concept for Aimé Guibert. He sees it as a form of competition.” (Yaouanc, 2003)

In Yaouanc’s detailed study (2003), he shows that Guibert’s motives have evolved. Initially, he condemned the fact that the massif would become the land of an American and not local wine-growers. Calculation of his own interests was based on locals being the priority. He found an echo of his viewpoint at the cave coopérative in the early days of the negotiations. But when the cave changed its opinions after further negotiation with Mondavi, Aimé Guibert changed his mobilising viewpoint too. Defence of the massif then became based on environmental arguments. Clearance on the scale of Mondavi’s project could modify the micro-climate in the Gassac valley. It was at this time that he created the defence committee for the Arboussas massif, with his own wife as secretary. The Guibert Family’s attitude can perhaps be interpreted as a corporatiste defence of their own interests.

Here is how the defence committee for the Arboussas massif expressed its opinion in the open letter it sent to President Vézínet. These extracts show the corporatiste reflex of preference for what is most familiar (in our example, the preference is for local people):10
“Do you not believe that this incredible locomotive should be created with the wine-growers of our region, as many do believe, and not by putting ourselves at the mercy of a multinational? We are not against globalisation, but on the condition that it be achieved with clarity and concentration. We want to remain in control of our decisions, especially when they concern communal property. We cannot understand that our local representatives have been able to negotiate with the Mondavi group under such opaque conditions, as if the inhabitants of Aniane were to be faced with a fait accompli without ever having been able to express their agreement or disagreement.”

Several characteristics of the corporatiste attitude can be seen in these sentences: a refusal of change, fear of foreigners, defence of the small, local producer against the huge multinational, a predilection for the people and suspicion regarding elected representatives and the élite who decide or think from afar and from above, to the detriment of the ordinary people. In the same vein, we have chosen other declarations of a similar style, that stir up deadly fears. Mr. Pouget, one of the founders of the association for the defence of the Arboussas massif, said, “If Mondavi wins, it will be the death of wine in Aniane”, or Aimé Guibert,

“We are not against foreigners coming here. In Languedoc, there are people from the Burgundy and Champagne regions, and the Rothschild family has associated with four towns in the Aude département to co-produce an excellent wine. But they have bought land or vineyards that were available, without them being attributed by politicians [...]. Those who have been taken in will have to bear the responsibility before their children.” (Degionni, 2001c)

Are these tensions around the subject of the defence of interests and tradition part of the French exception? As Capdevielle observed in 2001, in his Modernité du corporatisme (The modernity of corporatisme),

“the extraordinary and sustained popularity of figures such as José Bové, both in France and abroad, the failure of the WTO in Seattle and subsequently, confirm that we have entered a new political era. The most varied forms of corporatisme have joined together in their universal refusal of the globalisation of free exchange and have taken advantage of a new legitimacy. By presenting itself as an irreversible process at the end of which there are only winners, globalisation has created its own legitimacy as it spreads. From being an alibi for gaining acceptance of a questioning of acquired advantages, it has become a catalyst for resistance and refusal.” (Capdevielle, 2001)

It is precisely this mechanism that was involved in the Mondavi affair. We were in the presence of the triple-winning game (the Win-Win-Win), where everyone seemed to be a winner (Mondavi, the cave coopérative, and even the land, as Languedoc would be enriched by a wine of exceptional quality), except those who actively decided not to be winners, preferring to maintain the status quo as a means of preserving their privileged position (the Guibert family), their tranquillity (the inhabitants of Aniane), their hobbies (hunters and hill-walkers) or their environment (ecologists), or of taking control of the town hall (Mr. Diaz). The latter were to get their revenge in the municipal elections, standing against the former mayor, Ruiz, who was accused of a lack of transparency and of deciding, on his own, what was good for others.

In fact, the upshot of this coalition of diverse interests (communists, ecologists, hunters, farmers, inhabitants with no political label, and so on) seems to have been threats, which, in their multiple aspects, lead to a mechanism of union, thus making it easier for a large number of inhabitants to join together in the face of adversity. This was
all the easier given that the opposition was the archetype of American capitalism. By looking at some of the declarations made publicly by the Guibert Family, it is possible to see to exactly to what extent the press played a role in demonising the American project. The threat was not a given fact, but became a deliberate construction:

“*It is a stupid and bad project. Letting financial groups such as Mondavi set up here will lead to the destruction of our social fabric. We will become like the Hispanics employed in the vineyards in California. These huge wine-producers represent a culture of domination over a world of clients and subjects. This is exactly the opposite of the wonderful Languedocian world, made up of a wide variety of talents, combined with passion, and people with good, familiar faces.*” (Nappez, 2000);

“A man who produces 200 million bottles a year from 1,500 hectares in the United States cannot talk about quality. For me, Mondavi wine is yoghurt”, (N.C. 2000d);

“It is vulgar, impudent colonialism” (Degionni, 2001c);

“It is outrageous that anyone is considering giving this mountain area, with its wealth of plants and wildlife, to a financial monster,” (Monin, 2000);


This construction of a threat corresponds to an enactment strategy, the aim of which is to render the environment as hostile as possible to the adversary’s project. As a means of guiding this spirit of resistance, the Guibert family created a defence committee. It was at this precise moment that the analysis of the Guibert family’s opposition entered the realm of entrepreneurship (Torrès, 2003b). In his study, Yaouanc (2003, p.42) describes Guibert as an ‘entrepreneur of protestation’.

In our opinion, the attitude of the Guibert family epitomises a form of entrepreneurship prioritarily focused on avoiding threats. Although the sense of initiative is clearly present, it expresses itself through protestation and through mechanisms for the preservation of acquired advantages, in a way that is at the same time virulent and efficient. This type of entrepreneurship is a mixture of independence and preservation of privileged positions. In this sense, we describe this type of entrepreneurship as corporatiste. The adjective ‘corporatiste’ must not be understood in a disparaging way because it also evokes a form of resistance. This resistance can be the place where the entrepreneurial phenomenon manifests itself when the leader creates a structure whose aim is to preserve a given situation or fight changes which are considered to be a vector for regression and not progress.

We defend the theory that the creation of a defence committee is an entrepreneurial phenomenon whose aim, here, is to defend the particular interests of a group of professionals or a profession, generally going through a period of crisis. In the Mondavi affair, the creation of the protest movement was given its impetus by the Guibert family, and then took on a more political dimension through Manuel Diaz. It was by creating the defence committee that the Guibert family, supported by other protesters, inspired a degree of dynamism that would get Mr. Diaz, the original mayor’s opponent, comfortably elected, and lead to the failure of Mondavi’s project to settle in the Hérault. This case perfectly illustrates Dejardin’s statements:
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“By their vote or lobbies, the entrepreneurs, or rent-seekers, in society have an influence on political organisation and decisions made at this level. The idea is then that the political balance that responds to the interests of one or other group will take the measures that favour its maintenance.” (Dejardin, 2000, p.27)

The first action of the newly elected mayor was to send a letter to the Préfecture demanding that the deliberations of the former municipal council be suspended. This decision tolled the knell of the installation process as the Americans saw it as a lack of respect for something that is, according to Baudry (2003), sacred in their business culture: the signature of a contract.

7 Conclusion

More than a simple comparative analysis with the USA, evoking a form of entrepreneurship that we qualify as corporatiste is perhaps the key idea of this case study, and the main explanation for the failure of the project.

The basic idea behind this paper is the theory that entrepreneurship must be accompanied by a theory of corporatisme. The more entrepreneurs there are, the more innovation and change there is, the more these changes generate forms of resistance to change and strategies for avoiding threats. The paradox is that in a society that is becoming increasingly entrepreneurial, corporatiste movements are also obliged to multiply and grow.

This idea merits a remark. Today, innovation is increasingly organised on a territorial basis, as can be seen in the concept of clusters or learning regions. Territory has become the site of innovation and thus the ideal area for change and entrepreneurial involvement. It is therefore at this level that neo-corporatisme should be understood. Neo-corporatisme often takes territorialised forms that lead to the emergence of what we refer to as 'toporatisme', or 'site corporatisme'. This concept can be defined as the expression of collective movements for the defence of a site (a district, town, region ...) with the strategic aim of preserving a privileged position. The creation of the defence committee for the Arboussas massif is a perfect example.

Taking an interest in corporatisme from an entrepreneurial viewpoint is also admitting that the consequences of the entrepreneurial act are never neutral and that they can provoke negative reactions from certain privileged parties. More, it is considering that corporatiste strategies can be borne by entrepreneurs whose aim is no longer to take advantage of an opportunity but which has become instead an avoidance of threats. This is what can be called corporatiste entrepreneurship. By analysing the Guibert family, we have shown that the entrepreneurs of old can become the corporatises of today. As Dejardin (2000, p.27) so rightly remarks, "an enterprising entrepreneur must feel, when in a position of (temporary) strength, a powerful urge to adopt the behaviour of a rent-seeker". It is in this sense that avoiding threats can, just as much as seizing an opportunity, be part of an entrepreneurial approach.

Understanding the contemporary forms of corporatisme and how it develops is a challenge that has been laid down not only for academics little accustomed to working on this type of question, but also, and above all, for entrepreneurs themselves as it is they who are, in the end, directly confronted with the problem. Knowing the mechanisms of
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corporatisme, and thus knowing how to get round the traps it involves, is certainly not
without interest for entrepreneurs.

This study is insufficient, as a single case study is rarely suitable for constituting the
basis of a generalisation. Yet, can we be sure that this affair is not advance warning of a
type of behaviour that seems set to recur? Is it a rare bird, some kind of anomaly of no
scientific interest, or the black swan that disproves a general theory in the aim of putting
it into perspective?

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Notes

1 Originally, corporatisme was a hierarchical socio-economic system in which professional associations were structured on the basis of a criterion of particular interests, and organised into professional bodies. The State authorities endowed these bodies with the power to supervise the management of common interests within the profession and to cooperate organically with the economic management directorate. Two forms of corporatisme are generally described. On the one hand, the corporatisme of associations or professions, initiated by those directly involved, and, on the other, the corporatisme of the State, created by the State authorities. In terms of behaviour, the term corporatisme also includes the notion of esprit de corps, which is the driving force behind those who defend the categorial interests of a group. Taken to the extreme, corporatisme signifies a person or a group of people who take into consideration only the most narrow interests of a specific category, to the detriment of those of all other categories or society in general. From an entrepreneurial point of view, we define corporatisme as a predisposition for an entrepreneur to preserve his own privileged situation (rent-seeking behaviour).

2 France is divided administratively into 96 départements, grouped together in 22 régions.

3 Four months before the investment project was definitively abandoned.

4 Enarques are graduates of ENA, a ‘Grande Ecole’ for public administrators.
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5’Global Entrepreneurship Monitor’ (GEM) is one of the largest comparative surveys on entrepreneurship in the world: 33 countries have taken part in this study, the French representative being the E.M. LYON.

6“In personalist French culture, it is more important to leave an original mark than to get impersonally diluted into preestablished categories, even in order to facilitate collective action. French culture is essentialist, with everyone assessed for what they are and not for what they do. The Americans judge individuals according to what they do. The better the performance, the greater the reward and the better paid the person, and the better their performance will be. Any subsequent drop in performance leads to a correlative decrease in recognition. It is not intrinsically linked to the person but only to his or her actions” (Baudry, 2003).

7In French, the words ‘corporatiste’ and ‘corporatisme’ refer to the concept of ‘corporation’1.

8A direct link can be established with the law of proxemics and the wall phenomenon developed by Moles and Rohmer (Torrès, 2003a), and corporatisme, which is both a proxemic-preference, granted to oneself and one’s entourage (friends and peers), and a wall-protection in relation to others (outsiders and foreigners). It is not without pertinence to establish a link between the intensification of the proxemic effects associated with the smallness of companies and the corporatiste behaviour of small business owners. Corporatisme is then only an extreme version of the effects of proximity that have already been highlighted in SMEs and VSEs (Torrès, 2003b, 2004).

9In the French agricultural sector, semi-public companies such as the SAFER (Sociétés d’Aménagement Foncier et d’Etablissement Rural, land development and rural establishment companies) have a preemptive right, that is, the right to acquire ownership of an estate when it is sold, in preference to any other buyer. In the 1960s, the SAFER were set up at the request of the agricultural profession. Of the shareholders of the SAFER, there are agricultural unions, agricultural banks, the federation of caves coopératives and so on. All this means that all the staff of the SAFER are highly dependent on the agricultural profession. The SAFER are a good illustration of French culture. France is, in effect, the only European state that has these semi-public organisations that are both state-controlled (the role of government commissioners for finance and agriculture) and corporatiste (defending as a priority the interests of the profession).

10We are a far-cry from the famous ‘Volem viure al país’ or ‘Gardarem lo Larzac’.

11All the administrative services of the département.

12Other types of differences also played a decisive role. For example, this affair brought into direct opposition two types of wine culture (Bartlett, 2003). The first is based on demand, represented by the Americans, for whom wine is a product like any other. The other is based on offer, represented by the French, for whom wine is a product that cannot be dissociated from national culture. In France, the concept of terroir and Appellation d’Origine Contrôlée (AOC) are once again the perfect examples of the theory of the importance of the State and the tendency to preserve privileged positions (Torrès, 2003b). Similarly, the fact that communal land was to be given to a foreigner united a wide range of griefs, and was the trigger for the corporatiste self-defence process. This is another illustration of Cohen-Tanugi’s theory (1985), in which there is a ‘clear line between the public and the private’ within French society. Several of the Guibert family’s declarations express this categoric refusal to transfer to the private domain what belongs to the public domain: “Mondavi only has to move 500 m and there would be no more problem”, (Coignard, 2000); “We believe that Mondavi should not settle here in this manner, getting the authorities to give him the land. Why can’t he go through the usual channels of acquisition, like everyone else?” (N.C., 2000a); “Knowing that there is very good, unforested land not far from Aniane, near Puéchabon, you have to wonder why an American multinational should be allowed to have what has been refused to local wine-growers for twenty-five years” (Dupont, 2000a).
## Appendix 1: Comparative matrix of entrepreneurship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corporatiste entrepreneurship</th>
<th>The Guibert family</th>
<th>The Mondavi family and their representative, David Pearson</th>
<th>Liberal entrepreneurship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Need for recognition,</td>
<td>“Instead of supporting a large fish who does nothing for the region, I would rather we settled thirty or so families on this land,” Gilbert (Sedar, 2001).</td>
<td>“My father has taught me two things: how to produce the best wine possible, and how to present it in the best way possible” Tim Mondavi (Medevielle, 2000).</td>
<td>Need for achievement, Need for self-realisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for a sense of belonging</td>
<td>“We’re the ones who live here,” Gilbert (Sedar, 2001).</td>
<td>“I am very confident: we are going to be able to do great things here and we will then be able to tell the whole world about the value of the Languedoc land” Tim Mondavi (N.C., 2000b).</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Here, we’re a family that loves wine and that has no outside capital,” (Le Puill, 2000a).</td>
<td>“a great wine always makes people happy” Tim Mondavi (Medevielle, 2000).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>“What we want to do is very demanding: we have to create wines of very high quality but with a high risk factor. This will cost us twice as much as a normal vineyard would cost. This way of doing things is not necessarily the best way to set young wine-growers up. It is another way of seeing things” Pearson, (Le Puill, 2000a).</td>
<td>“What we want to do is very demanding: we have to create wines of very high quality but with a high risk factor. This will cost us twice as much as a normal vineyard would cost. This way of doing things is not necessarily the best way to set young wine-growers up. It is another way of seeing things” Pearson, (Le Puill, 2000a).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Instinct for protection</td>
<td>“Daumas Gassac’s commitment to saving the forest and the environment”, Aimé (N.C., 2000e).</td>
<td>“When you’re sitting on a goldmine, it isn’t easy to share”, Tim Mondavi (N.C., 1999).</td>
<td>Instinct for competition</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>“Yes, the Guibert Family will fight anyone, via the legal system, and for as many months or years as it takes, anyone who tries to destroy a protected forest that is the guardian of the entrance to the Gorges of the Hérault”, Aimé (N.C., 2000e).</td>
<td>“It took us twenty years to find an Italian family with whom we could join forces. It took us seven years in Chile. Today, faced with the diversity and complexity of the terroirs, we are starting to learn about the Languedoc. Our guiding principle is to make great wines and to find the best way to do so” Tim Mondavi (Ramon, 1999).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>“The first battle took place around fifteen years ago, when the Compagnie française des carriers (French quarry company), just like Mondavi today, asked to be allowed to destroy the forest in order to quarry stone. After a ten-year legal battle, the quarrymen were nonsuited” Aimé (N.C., 2000e).</td>
<td>“For the moment, there is no market for the Languedoc AOC in the United States. But we must be realistic and visionary. We must not forget the Canadian and Asian markets” Pearson (Ramon, 1999).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence of a privileged position</td>
<td>“Knowing that there is very good, unforested land not far from Aniane, near Puéchabon, “an exceptional vineyard”, Robert Mondavi (Deglonni, 2001b).</td>
<td>“As Americans, we treat wine like any other business. Whereas here, in the large vineyards and French chateaux, wine-making is considered to be a great art”, Robert Mondavi</td>
<td>Search for a pioneering advantage</td>
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<td></td>
<td>“Everyone thought I was crazy” Robert Mondavi (Deglonni, 2001b).</td>
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you have to wonder why an American multinational should be allowed to have what has been refused to local wine-growers for twenty-five years, bearing in mind that it is they who built up today’s reputation for Aniane produce!” Aimé (Dupont, 2000a).

“Clearance on the scale of what is planned in the Mondavi project could modify the micro-climate of the Gassac valley, which is characterised by cool nights (8 or 9 degrees lower than in the village of Aniane). This coolness is the reason behind the thick-skinned grapes that play such a key role in making the wine produced here so typical”. Samuel, (Coignard, 2000).

“Robert Mondavi and his sons, Tim and Mickaël, have found terroirs of quality here. But they have also found dynamic and emerging wine-growing. The family has rediscovered the spirit that drove them in the 1960s, at the start of their wine-growing experiences in California. Those experiences were always directed toward quality. It is possible to say that Mondavi has developed a unique approach in California, and this has made him the champion of high-quality wines alongside the most standard and large-scale productions” Pearson, (Nappez, 2000).

“Here, we find ourselves on a limestone lake-bed, at an altitude that produces the cool nights necessary for the correct ripening of

Strategies for avoiding threats

“It is vulgar, impudent colonialism”, Aimé (Degionni, 2001c).

“It’s a billionaire’s whim! Mondavi only has to move 500 meters and there would be no more problem”, Samuel (Coignard, 2000).

“It is outrageous that anyone is considering giving this mountain area, with its wealth of plants and wildlife, to a financial monster”, Aimé (Monin, 2000).


Strategies for searching for opportunities

“struck by the beauty of the countryside, the climate and the incredible potential of the Languedoc region.”

“a truly excellent wine” Tim Mondavi (Medevielle, 2000).

“The wines produced here could become some of the best in the world, but the wine-growers need to be convinced of this themselves” Tim Mondavi (Ramon, 1999).

“We knew immediately that our search had come to an end here. When, with the oenologist Thomas Durous, we climbed the slopes of the Arboussas massif, in Aniane, it was an incredible emotional shock. No doubt: on these high garrigues, above the Hérault valley, would be developed the great wine that the Mondavi family hoped to create in Languedoc” Pearson, (Nappez, 2000).

“Here, we find ourselves on a limestone lake-bed, at an altitude that produces the cool nights necessary for the correct ripening of
“O. Torrès

The grapes. This really is an exceptional place in which we are going to be able to create a product of extremely high quality”, Pearson, (Nappez, 2000).

“It was like love at first sight. We knew at once that it was a mythical place and that we should produce our wine here” Pearson (Ramon, 2000).

“In our opinion, it is the most dynamic region, with the greatest potential”, Pearson (Coignard, 1999).

“Those who have given the Languedoc wines their excellent reputation are, in 90% of cases, young, passionate wine-growers working on 5–25 hectare vineyards. They have nothing in common with someone like Mondavi, who sells 300 million cases a year”, (Le Puill, 2000a).

“The war has only just begun. We will not give in”, Samuel (N.C., 2000a).

“This is not, for us, merely a stupid anti-American reflex. We believe that Mondavi should not settle here in this manner, getting the authorities to give him the land. Why can’t he go through the usual channels of acquisition, like everyone else?” Samuel (N.C., 2000a).

“It is a stupid and bad project. Letting financial groups such as Mondavi set up here will lead to the destruction of our social fabric. We will become like the Hispanics employed in the vineyards in California. These huge wine-producers represent a culture of domination over a world of clients and subjects. This is exactly the opposite of the wonderful Languedocian world, made up of a wide variety of talents, combined with passion, and people with good, familiar faces”, Ainé (Nappez, 2000).

“A man who produces 200 million bottles a year from 1,500 hectares in the USA cannot talk about quality. For me, the lack of support given to the project by the newly-elected mayor and town council in Aniane, as well as the administrative, legal and political obstacles that have arisen through this change in the elected members, prevents us from forming a solid partnership, and represents an uncertainty and risks that are too high for the feasibility of the project in the long term” (Bruynooghe, 2001).

“This is a long term project, which will only be profitable in ten to fifteen years” Tim Mondavi (Medevielle, 2000).

“We have decided to withdraw from the project definitively. There are too many personal and political interests for us to comprehend” Pearson, (Degionni, 2001a).

“[Our] project does not involve setting up an American-style winery. What we want is a vineyard that will produce good quality wine from its own vines. [We] have been working with ecologists for months to make an inventory of the plant species that must be preserved and we propose the creation of small plots of 5 hectares within the forest so as not to transform the Arbousas into a vast area of open land” Pearson, (Monin, 2000).

“This is a French project that will fit in perfectly with Languedocian culture and which will, in time, produce 20,000 cases (or 240,000 bottles) of red pays d’Oc wine, an assemblage with the Syrah grape at its base” Pearson, (Ramon, 2000).

“We are negotiating directly with

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</table>
Mondavi wine is yoghurt”, Aimé (N.C., 2000d).

the wine-growers of Aniane as our installation must be transparent. This is a condition that is vital for promoting this project, which is for around fifty hectares, of which approximately 30% are private plots” Pearson (L.L., 2000).

We are negotiating partnerships to preserve the spirit of the land on which we settle. In Aniane, we want to give the impression of a traditional French vineyard” Pearson (L.L., 2000).

Appendix 2: Database of papers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>References</th>
<th>Title of the paper</th>
<th>Name of newspaper</th>
<th>Issue date</th>
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<tr>
<td>N.C. (2002)</td>
<td>Depardieu, prêt à acheter 5 à 7 hectares à Aniane</td>
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<td>N.C. (2001o)</td>
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<td>Sedar (2001)</td>
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<td>Midi Libre</td>
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<td>Bernard (2001c)</td>
<td>Le Languedoc se noie dans les stocks : Face à la chute des prix, la grogne monte chez les viticulteurs</td>
<td>Libération</td>
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<td>La Tribune (Desfossés), No. 24465</td>
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<td>Pudlowski (1999)</td>
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<td>Coignard (1999)</td>
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